From my favorite Orthodox blog, Prof. Peter Gilbert’s De Unione Ecclesiarum –
I finally have some good news to report. Today I received an e-mail from the Managing Editor of the journal Communio, informing me that the Summer 2009 issue is now, at last, in print, and that they have decided to feature my article on “John Bekkos as a Reader of the Fathers” on their website. A link to the website, showing the contents of their current issue, is http://www.communio-icr.com/latest.htm; a permanent link to the article, in PDF format, is http://www.communio-icr.com/articles/PDF/gilbert36-2.pdf
A few choice bits from the article, emphasis mine (but please read the whole thing before commenting) –
John Bekkos, who served as Patriarch of Constantinople during the years of the Union of Lyons (1275–1282) and who not merely accepted that union as a practical political necessity but defended it on the grounds of its theological truth, is not a popular man in much of the Christian East; many people view him as a traitor to Orthodoxy. He earns this reputation by virtue of having defended the view that the Latin doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit, the teaching that the Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son as from a single principle, is reconcilable and compatible with Greek patristic tradition.
… How far John Bekkos did or did not convert to Catholicism is a legitimate question; but it is not the question I chiefly wish to ask in this paper. I mention it here merely to give one specimen of new thinking about John Bekkos, thinking that presents some hope that long-entrenched views about him—the automatic assumption of his estrangement from the mind and heart of Orthodoxy—might be due for reassessment. Bekkos is increasingly being recognized as an early practitioner of what is now called “ecumenism.” The word “ecumenism” did not exist in Bekkos’s day, and it may be doubted whether he would have looked favorably on all modern varieties of it—whatever people may say about him, John Bekkos was not a doctrinal relativist—but that Bekkos was, in some sense, a thirteenth-century Orthodox ecumenist can hardly be denied. What is vital to note is that Bekkos consciously modeled his “ecumenism” upon the practice of the fathers of the Church. He saw the effort to move beyond verbal differences to a recognition of fundamental doctrinal agreement, where such agreement in truth existed, as an essential part of the fathers’ theological work. Christian faith is, in the final analysis, a faith not in words, but in things—and intellectual effort is sometimes needed to get beyond mere words to the realities that words signify. The fathers were willing to engage in that intellectual effort in order to preserve the unity of the Church; Bekkos saw himself as following in their footsteps.
… I would contend that his reading of the fathers of the Church provides real insight into what the fathers, or some of them at least, were saying. To dismiss John Bekkos as an “anthologist,” a man who “juggles texts” or collects them mechanically without any genuine insight into their meaning, is to perpetrate a gross misrepresentation. Bekkos was a theologian; and his continuing ecumenical significance has to be based on the very real possibility that some of his readings of the patristic evidence are true.
The central part of the present article attempts to substantiate the claim that Bekkos’s patristic interpretation is an insightful one, that is, that he sees important aspects of the fathers’ teaching that others have missed. In particular, I shall argue (a) that Bekkos rediscovers something that may be called “Old Nicene” theology, (b) that, in line with this theology, Bekkos identifies a certain “logic” to the way the fathers speak about divine substance, (c) that crucial to Bekkos’s understanding of the trinitarian doctrine of the fathers is a recognition of what I would call “referential causality,” and (d) that, contrary to the claims of some, the reliability of most of Bekkos’s patristic citations is not in doubt, and that, for those texts whose genuineness is in doubt, there is reason to think that at least some of them are authentic.
… Whether or not one calls John Bekkos’s change of mind regarding the orthodoxy of the Latin Church a “conversion,” it seems undeniable that John Bekkos did, in fact, change his mind about the orthodoxy of the Latin Church as a result of the things he read while in prison in 1273 and immediately after his release from jail—basically, as a result of an intense study of the Greek Church fathers and of the interpretations of the fathers given by men like Niketas of Maroneia and Nikephoros Blemmydes. After publicly stating that the Latins were heretics, he came to see them as orthodox Christians, differing from Christians of the Greek Church, not in the essentials of their belief, but in the manner in which the one, common faith was expressed.
… John Bekkos was not a juggler of texts or an anthologist, but a man who was concerned to state the logical coherence of traditional Christian belief in the Trinity, and to state it in such a way as to show that the insights of the Latin and Greek Christian traditions are ultimately harmonious. He saw, and I think saw correctly, that the Filioque debate had deep historical roots; this debate arose out of earlier misunderstandings concerning person and substance in God. Bekkos sees Photius and Gregory of Cyprus as teaching, not Cappadocian theology pure and simple, but a kind of neo-Cappadocianism that, by radicalizing the person/substance distinction through logical premises which the Cappadocians themselves do not state, draws from this distinction consequences which the Cappadocians themselves do not draw. They could not have drawn these consequences, because to do so would have disallowed much of their own stated thought; they would not have done so, because they recognized that those who spoke differently than they did nevertheless shared with them one faith.
The Cappadocians practiced a kind of ecumenism; John Bekkos, in his role as bishop and teacher, thinks that he is authorized and obliged to do the same in the circumstances of his own time. The Cappadocians, in their day, articulated the mystery of the Trinity in a way that differed, in some significant respects, from the way St. Athanasius or St. Epiphanius or Pope St. Damasus articulated it; yet the Cappadocians strove to maintain communion with St. Athanasius and St. Epiphanius and Pope St. Damasus. Similarly, St. Maximus, in his day, recognized that the Latin-speaking Church articulated the mystery of the Holy Spirit’s procession in a way that differed from the way most Greek-speaking Christians did; yet he strove to maintain the bonds of communion, and said that he had never known the fathers to disagree with each other in thought, even though, very often, they disagree with one another verbally. John Bekkos thinks that reasons of Christian truth and love oblige him to imitate these holy men.… Trinitarian language becomes meaningless if it loses its concrete moorings in the revelation of God in Christ. John Bekkos understood that, as there is no approaching the Father except through the Son, so there is no knowing the Holy Spirit’s eternal relation to the Father except, implicitly or explicitly, through the Son. The Spirit does not lead to the Father except through the Son, nor does the Spirit come forth from the Father to us except through the Son. When theologians deny a mediation of divine being, when they confidently assert an ontology that makes the Son’s mediation of the Spirit’s ousia impossible, one must ask how they have acquired this mystical knowledge of the Father that shunts the Son off to the side.
John Bekkos did not shunt off the Son. He worshiped God the Logos, and logic played a role in how he worshiped him. He had no use for a “spirituality” that was not true rationality, just as he had no use for any new Spirit who is not through the Son. He was a diligent, painstaking researcher who cared about fact, because he cared about truth; but he did not worship the status quo. Pachymeres and others testify to Bekkos’s faith that, even if his own generation failed to appreciate what he had tried to do, future generations would understand. Time may yet prove him right.
A few observations:
– first, he says that Photius’ basic statements or axioms are nowhere in the Fathers (“not even if one will read through them a thousand times”), which is point-blank false.
– he then says that he will show that this is true by giving patristic statements which would contradict Photius (since it’s too great a task to read through all patristic texts), but nowhere in the whole document do we find any such statements: we only find his own take on a few Bible-passages.
– then he goes on to ask why on earth does it seem so illogical to us to think of an attribute held in common by two [or some] persons (i.e., neither all [three], nor just one) : but the question here is neither what seems logical, nor what doesn’t, but what the Fathers handed down to us: and they make it clear as day that attributes are either natural (or belonging to all [three]), or hypostatical (personal, or belonging to one). — Putting logic and reason or philosophy or even imagination before divine revelation is NOT the way to go.
– then he takes on St Basil the Great’s work against Eunomius and wants us to believe that the fact that the Saint says that the Father does al his works through the Son [they were speaking there of creation in particular, which is a natural attribute, and belongs to all three persons], then this follows that the Father’s procession of the Spirit is also done through the Son, contra St. Basil’s own words, that there are natural versus personal attributes, and whereas creation would be natural, procession is personal or hypostatic. — Again, directly contradicting the Saint’s own clearly-expressed and clearly-stated words.
Need I go on?
… and in the last two paragraphs quoted in your article, he confuses economy with theology. (Ok, I think I’ll stop here)
Dear Lucian
please do go on. if you can find Photius’ basic axioms in any of the Fathers before him – I mean explicitly taught, not statements that can be made to fit Photius by a bit of twisting – I will be very interested to hear them.
Lucian,
I think perhaps you should read the whole original article carefully. It is rather more lengthy and seems to answer your objections. This discussion will be something for me to watch as I expect it to be mainly between Orthodox coming at it from differnet viewpoints.
I should add that the one thing that struck me most in the original article was the way in which Bekkos accurately explained both the Catholic position and the linguistic problems involved in articulating it for an Eastern audience.
please do go on
OK, I will: here’s a proof, randomly chosen, from Saint Basil, about the uniqueness of personal attribiutes:
Wherefore in the communion of the substance we maintain that there is no mutual approach or intercommunion of those notes of indication perceived in the Trinity, whereby is set forth the proper peculiarity of the Persons delivered in the faith, each of these being distinctively apprehended by His own notes.
Too vague? Too forced? Too stretched? Care for another?
Western Theology matches:
Note of the Father: neither proceeding nor begotten, unoriginate origin of the Godhead.
Note of the Son: begotten from one, namely from the Father.
Note of the Holy Spirit: neither unoriginate nor begotten, but proceeding from both.
Uncreated being of course true for all three. And yet not three uncreateds, but one uncreated.
Western Theology matches:
…but proceeding from both.
Attributes belong to two sets: those belonging to the ousia, and those belonging to the hypostasis. St Basil in this random letter of his makes it clear that those belonging to the hypostasis belong only to one individual or person. He nowhere makes mention of a third cathegory, nor do any of the other Eastern Fathers. So my question to You is: procession seems to belong to two, … so how do You square this with St Basil’s teaching on the subject?
You said:
The note of the person of the Father: unborn and unproceeding.
The note of the person of the Son: born of the Father.
The note of the person of the Holy Spirit: proceeding from both.
One note of the essence of them all: uncreated.
“This conception, however, must not be identified with filioque, since the Father and Son do not form one principle like in that Western doctrine; the proper cause of the Spirit is the Father. Phrases found in Gregory’s [Nyssa] writings which would allegedly imply that he favors the filioque have been proven to be interpolations.”
Lucian Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons, 2005, p. 68.
End note 45 “Simonetti agrees with Holl that neither Gregory nor the other two Cappadocians spoke of the filioque(see Manilo Simonetti, La crisi ariana nell IV secolo [Rome: Augustinanum, 1975], 449-451.”
Lucian,
I don’t see your quote as establishing anything other than that each person of the Trinity is revealed as uniquely distinct yet of one substance. How does this demonstrate Photius’ axiom?
Michael,
if You can’t even read straight, then I’m afraid I can’t be of much help to you either: he’s speaking there about the “notes of indication“ that distinguish between persons (i.e., about personal attributes). And about them it says that there’s NO “intercommunion” or “mutual approach”, but rather that “*each* of these [persons] is being distinctively apprehended by *His own notes*.” — I’m afraid I can’t spell it out more clearly than this.
Saint Basil: Letter XXXVIII, to his Brother Gregory, concerning the difference between ousia and hypostasis.
I get all that, I just don’t see how it follows from Basil that two of the three cannot share the same attribute other than the one substance. Any shared attribute could not be “mutual” or reciprocal, but beyond that…
It sounds to me like you are taking the axiom as a post facto given, and reading it into Basil. It could be that Basil meant it that way, but it wouldn’t even have occurred to me if you hadn’t drawn my attention to the possibility.
Note that this is not an argument over the filioque per se as Catholics do not understand the filioque in a sense that would violate Photius’ axiom. It’s just that this particular axiom does not necessarily follow logically from a straight reading of what Basil has written.
It’s not ‘reciprocal’, it’s “mutual” & “intercommunion”. See also the other examples I gave, read the whole letter, and think about it.
Here’s another one, from the same letter of Saint Basil:
The Son, Who declares the Spirit proceeding from the Father through Himself and with Himself, shining forth alone and by only-begetting from the unbegotten light, so far as the peculiar notes are concerned, has nothing in common either with the Father or with the Holy Ghost.
Still not clear enough? Here’s anotehr one:
But God, Who is over all, alone has, as one special mark of His own hypostasis, His being Father, and His deriving His hypostasis from no cause; and through this mark He is peculiarly known.
Still think I’m bluffin`?
And since it is necessary, by means of the notes of differentiation, in the case of the Trinity, to keep the distinction unconfounded, we shall not take into consideration, in order to estimate that which differentiates, what is contemplated in common, as the uncreate, or what is beyond all comprehension, or any quality of this nature; we shall only direct our attention to the enquiry by what means each particular conception will be lucidly and distinctly separated from that which is conceived of in common.
Still not convinced?…
No, I am not convinced; at least not that it proves what you seem to think it does.
Let’s take them one by one:
“so far as the peculiar notes are concerned, has nothing in common either with the Father or with the Holy Ghost.”
A plain reading of this gets you “insofar as what makes Him unique, the Son has nothing in common with the Father or with the Holy Ghost”. This strikes as rather unremarkable.
Then you have the Father being unique by virtue of being unoriginate. I still don’t see how this proves Photius’ axiom.
Finally, Basil warns that you have to distinguish the three Persons according to their differences not according to what they share. And…?
Before you start insulting my intelligence again, you might consider that we have a real epistemological problem here. You are coming to these texts with a preconceived understanding of their significance. This understanding may or may not be correct. My patristic scholarship is certainly not deep enough to tell one way or another. I, however, am coming to these texts for the first time; and from a superficial reading (since they are selective quotations offered without surrounding context) I don’t see them as having the import you and apparently Photius ascribe to them.
And it can’t be a matter of willfull blindness on my part as the filioque AS CATHOLICS UNDERSTAND IT does not rise or fall on whether Photius’ axiom is correct.
Now I suppose you could further claim that Bekkos somehow never read Basil and so was unable to see how this Father must of meant what Photius inferred, but this strikes me as unlikely. What is far more likely is that he read these passages in the same way I have just done, and simply did not see them as demonstrating what you think they do. So Bekkos must be an idiot as well.
Look at the title of the letter: it’s about ousia [meaning nature or substance] & hypostasis, meaning person: and St. Basil explains the difference between the two: the first is characterized by a set of attributes belonging to all members of a group; while the last by a set of attributes belonging to just one individual member of the set, setting it apart from all the others.
What’s to see is that the personal or hypostatic attributes are not shared in common by two, but belong only to one person or hypostasis… And apart from these, the only other attributes out there are the natural ones, belonging to all (as can easily be seen throughout the entire letter, in case you may think my sample-texts are selective, and I’m hiding something from You).
Wherefore in the communion of the substance we maintain that there is no mutual approach or intercommunion of those notes of indication perceived in the Trinity, whereby is set forth the proper peculiarity of the Persons delivered in the faith, *each* of these being *distinctively* apprehended by *His own* notes.
The Son, […] so far as the peculiar [personal or hypostatic] notes are concerned, has nothing in common either with the Father or with the Holy Ghost.
etc.
Personal means for St. Basil (and all other EASTERN Fathers) what’s ‘peculiar’ or particular to ‘one’ person (as can be seen from all the examples); and natural what all have in common; and a third set [i.e., of attributes belonging to ‘some’, but not ‘all’] is unknown to ANY of the EASTERN Fathers.
I can’t make it any clearer than this: OUSIA & HYPOSTASIS. — how can You CONTINUE to ask me of *personal* attributes belonging to *two*, when St. Basil defines ‘hypostatic’ as belonging to one only OVER AND OVER AGAIN throughout his entire letter !?
P.S.: Perry, there can be but ONE Lucian on this blog.. and I’m not the one You’re quoting, so..
I wonder what would happen if we treated Saint Photios as charitably as Bekkos?
Michael,
What’s an attribute?
A quality ascribed to a person or thing?
Perry,
As a theologian one would have to. As a churchman, however, he deserves no more charity than he offered his contemporaries. He persecuted and humiliated his saintly predecessor; then tried to suck up to him with transparently insincere flattery after St Ignatius’ reinstatement; he blew hot and cold with Rome depending on how he felt it would affect his claim to the patriarchal see, and he insulted all those who disagreed with him in the most vile terms a clerical vocabulary would allow–shocking even the other Eastern Patriarchs with his vitriol.
Michael,
Does God have different qualities or one quality?
Michael how does Photios compare in character to Cyril of Alexandria do you think?
I am afraid scholastic hair splitting is not my forte.
As for St. Cyril, he was haughty, violent, unscrupulous and vindictive. He was canonized for his orthodoxy in my view, not for his personal sanctity.
Well doesn’t the matter depend on what an attribute is? If it does, I am not sure how your conclusion can go through against Saint Photios until that matter is settled. A reservation of judgment is then in order it seems.
As for Cyril, shall we then on that basis give him in like manner only the charity he “deserves?” Shall we extend to you only the charity you “deserve” as well?
What is your judgment?
Lucian
indeed there is no communion in the hypoostatic properties.
It’s just that before Photius it was agennesia – being unbegotten and uncaused – that is seen as being the Father’s hypostatic property. It is Photius who decides that being unique proboleus of the Spirit is part of his hypostatic characteristic. You are indeed anachronistically reading that Photian principle back into an earlier theological context.
Find the phrase “ek monou tou Patros ekporeuomenon” in any Father before Photius. You won’t – he was the first to use it. He was an innovator.
It is true that the Greek Fathers never explicitly call the Son a cause, reserving this term for the Father. This, however, is because they never distinguish between primary and secondary cause, so for them the word cause necessarily denotes the ultimate cause.
Catholic theology agrees that the Father alone is the only ultimate – protarchtic cause, if I may coin an English term from the Greek. He is the source of all divinity – pege tes theotetos. That is his personal characteristic, and he does not communicate it to the Son as he “produces” the Holy Spirit through him.
Patience, my dear Watson! Let’s take it one step at a time, shall we? One lie at a time, to be more precise. — OK? First thing’s first: Saint Basil himself defines hypostatical or personal as belonging ONLY to ONE member of a set, and natural or substantial as belonging to ALL members of a given set: contra Bekkos, and *pro* Photios.
Bekkos: 1; Photios: 0.
(The above is the lie-counter, … not the usual score-counter, OK?)
Fr. Paul,
Did the Fathers or Sabellians use “homoousious” prior to Alexander and Athanasius? Is the use of a term sufficient to imply innovation?
Did John of Damascus affirm or deny that being the unique proboleus of the Spirit was true of the Father?
How would you gloss the distinction between primary and secondary causation? Where is its philosophical locus?
If the Father is an uncaused cause and the Son a caused cause, is the Spirit then an uncausing effect within God? If not, why?
Your Q:
“Did John of Damascus affirm or deny that being the unique proboleus of the Spirit was true of the Father?”
St Thomas Aquinas:
a) (either) deny, in which (case) he followed a local error of the Nestorians
b) unless it be said that denial does not follow strictly from his words
The words quoted by St Thomas Aquinas from St John of Damascus being:
“Not say” does not mean “say that not”. It may be used as a polite variation, but it may also mean something different: Like the statement of the Second Council, that of St John of Damascus also may have been a diplomatic evasion of a terminological issue threatening to divide the Church as that Council and that Saint knew them.
Have you checked with St Gregory Palamas? According to the Jesuits’ article on him in Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, his foremost difference from Latins was saying even in Heaven only the energies and not the essence of God is seen by the Blissful – which was condemned by Rome. In Petrology he was said to have believed St Peter was not so much the first as the only Pope, in Mariology he was certianly not attributing hereditary guilt to the Theotokos, and in Pneumatology he is said to have been as close to the filioque as the Photian tradition allowed him to be. Even if you say Jesuits are Latins and not Orthodox, why not check it up?
Source for Aquinas on Damascene:
Summa, Ima Pars, Q. 37
and I cannot remember which article.
Hans,
I am aware of what Aquinas says about John. But what I am interested is not Aquinas’ interpretation of John but what John says. BTW, its Prima Pars, Q. 36, a. 2.obj. 3.
Actually, Thomas is wrong about Nestorius if I am not mistaken. In actual fact, a rumor circulated that Cyril affirmed that the Son was also the cause of the Spirit, an idea which was probably indebeted to Arianism. The Nestorians and their sympathizers, including Theodoret I believe responded with outrage at the idea of a Filioque. Cyril responds and in fact denies that he ever taught such a thing. So the idea isn’t distinctly Nestorian, unless Cyril the arch-anti-Nestorian is a Nestorian too. Thomas is a smart man, one of the smartest of all, but if his facts are off due to no fault of his own but to mistaken sources, then his argument is a bad one.
Second, Maximus even earlier than John expressly and even more precisely denies the Filioque in the letter to Marius. And Maximus is even further back than John of Damascus in terms of being prior to Photios. Maximus is no innovator and neither is Photios. John was very much familiar with the writings of Maximus and used them often. So I find it far more plausible that he is following Maximus than the reading that Aquinas gives.
Third, no Fathers that I know of or not hardly any explicitly deny in the way that Thomas would require that the Spirit and the Father hypostatically as one principle cause the person of the Son, but that doesn’t imply that it is in any way permissable to teach it or that they taught as much. The latter is not licensed from such reasoning and so not the former either by modus tollens.
I’ve read everything from Palamas in English and some not in English so I don’t need to rely on secondary hostile literature.
As for the essence and energies distinction, one doesn’t need to go to Palamas, since the 6th council affirms two energies in Christ which are not the same thing as the two essences and they do so following Maximus.
I don’t think really any of the eastern fathers teach the idea of hereditary guilt so the fact that the didn’t think the Theotokos had it is neither here nor there. The question is one of corruption and not guilt.
Thank you, I’ll look it up.
I was interested in the quote given two different interpretations by St Thomas Aquinas.
The quote from St Maximos that I am aware of says the Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and economically, that is to us, from the Son. It does not contain any reference either confirmative or adverse to eternal procession from the Son as well.
Hostile? Are you implying the Jesuits of the recently past century who wrote Dictionnaire de la Théologie Catholique were hostile to Palamas?
If you can misconstrue the Jesuits as much, how come I must trust you are not misconstruing Palamas. But you did not answer all of my question about his position. If you have read him you are not only in a position to braga about having done so, but, as those Jesuits did, quote him.
I did not bring it up. But as far as I know, the 6th Council did not convene to define the distnction between essence and “energy” (is it energeia in Greek?) but to confute heretics who presumed on such a distinction to say, that even though Christ had two essences he might have only one single “energeia” and especially one single will.
In the human nature there IS of course a real distinction between nature and energeia (if that was the Greek word) or between nature and will.
Between Christs human nature and divine nature, there is a difference of nature, not of person. Between His human will and divine will, there is a difference of will, not of person. Between his human essence and human will there is a distinction (not making it essentialises criminality in the modern, psychiatric way), but is a clear refusal given to not accepting a corresponding distinction in God?
I do not know, since I have not read the acts. I am asking.
In the West, the same letter of Pope St Leo I to Turribius which says that the Spirit proceeds from both, there is a condemnation of Priscillianist doctrine or presumed doctrine, that Son and Spirit were “virtutes” (would you translate it “energeiai”?) of the Father.
Hans,
As for the e/e distinction, you did bring it up in the discussion of the Jesuit article you referenced on Palamas.
Maximus says “On the basis of these texts, they have shown that they have not made the Son the cause of the Spirit — they know in fact that the Father is the only cause of the Son and the Spirit, the one by begetting and the other by procession; but [they use this expression] in order to manifest the Spirit’s coming-forth (προϊέναι) through him and, in this way, to make clear the unity and identity of the essence…”
That certainly doesn’t seem like a glossing of the Spirit from the Son in the economia, but if you wish to concede that, then the Catholic use of it is certainly wrong.
Yes, I take most Catholic sources on Palamas to be hostile, just as I take most Catholic sources on say Luther or Protestant sources on Catholic theology to be hostile at least in so far as they reject the teaching. It is better to get the idea that people put forward from the people who put it forward rather than from people who reject it as false.
Braging has nothing to do with it. I was simply noting that I don’t feel the need to read secondary literature when I can read primary sources, unless of course the analysis is quite specialized and not a dictionary entry which will tend to be cursory.
The Sixth council didn’t meet to define Mary as ever virgin either, but it doesn’t mean that when they say she is that the teaching is optional either.
Furthermore, they don’t need to define energy just so long as they teach that Christ has two of them, which the council does, and Maximus uncontroversially does. We can then look at how Maximus uses energia and related terms to see what he and the council had in mind by the term. I think he had in essence in mind what the Cappadocians did and what Palamas did.
Just to clarify, you say that in Christ’s humanity there is a distinction between his essence and a human energy. Do you affirm the same for the divine essence which is the other nature of Christ? If so, then there are two energies in Christ, if not, then one. The council expressly says there are two essences in Christ and two energies. Maximus certainly seems to talk as if there is a distinction between the two and not a few modern expositors have taken him this way such as Thunberg in his massive Microcosm and Mediator. Balthasar I believe admits it as well and he’s no great lover of Palamas.
As for the Pricillist error, if they were teaching and the idea condemned was that the Son and the Spirit were external energies of the Father, then the condemnation is correct, for that would deny the unity of essence. On the other hand if they thought of it and the idea condemned was that the Son and the Spirit are internal energies of the Father I do not agree. In later Platonism, such as Plotinus, there is a distinction between internal and external energies of the One which probably set the schema or grid for much of the discussion on this point. Athanasius for example, though very rarely does speak of the Son as participating in the Father’s essence while denying that the Son is one with the Father by participation over against the Arians. The idea that he seems to be affirming is that the Son is an internal activity of the Father and so of the same essence and inseparable without any intervening principle. The fulcrum point then being not if the Son and Spirit are energies, but what kind of energies they are. This was exactly the point upon which the Neo-Arian debates turned as recently explicated by Michel Barnes in his book, The Power of God. The Neo Arians taking the Son to be an external and extrinsically related energy while Nyssa taking him to be an intrinsic energy of the Father.
Only to say that, yes the article takes that up, and yes on that account the article is if not hostile (there was no clear condemnation by rome, at least estranged) but what I was talking about was the other things where the article found him close to Catholic.
Thanks for clarification on original guilt. How about malediction, since Christ died to lift the malediction from us (Catechism of Philaret)?
bbl
That certainly does not seem to me to gloss the Spirit from the son as economia, I was referring to another quote (unless it be a contracted misquote of this one).
Think again.
There is a difference between Luther and Palamas, both in their relations to Rome and in their relations to the Fathers and in their relation to theological doctrines.
Even Luther we take as a better source for Catholic theology than 19th C sources like the ones calumniating St Robert Bellarmine. And even 18th – 19th C Protestant theologians we hold to be less insane than strict Faith alone or than double Predestination (two positions which Luther both espoused and then rejected or modified much enough to implicitly reject them).
When and if Palamas thought of Barlaam as a Westerner, we hold that to be a defetive view of the West. But Palamas as a theologian is another matter.
ONE or TWO things of the pro-Palamas councils were finally rejected by Rome:
1) applying the distinction essence and energy so as to deny that creatures can be sufficiently made God-like to see the essence of God in Heaven
2) probably, unless I misremember article, also the notion that we can see as much of God on Earth as in Heaven: if we could have the beatific vision on earth we would no longer be able to prefer any created thing to it and hence not to sin (St Peter denied our Lord after Tabor)
APART FROM THAT the doctrine of Palamas was never condemned by Rome. Fénélon was condemned on definately more issues than that, and is yet considered a Catholic author.
Even Luther in 1520 was condemned for some 20 – 30ish number of theses, some of which were from the 95, some from other works, and among those ones that contradict the reason why Mark of Ephesus contradicted purgatory, the philanthropos ho Theos. As you well know Luther in the end denied that the departed need much praying from us. No moeliebens, no liturgies on days 40 or on yeardays of death, no almsgiving for solicitations of intercessions, that is no agapai. Which is also in contradiction of St Mark of Ephesus.
Thinking that a Catholic of recent centuries would be only as bitter about Lutherans as about Orthodox is also as idiotic as thinking an Orthodox no bitterer against crusaders, who sacked monasteries on Morea, than about Monophysites.
When I read “Papism was the first Protestantism” I was impressed. It was on august 15 (New Calendar) 2006. Since then I’ve corrected it to: some bad crusaders were maybe among the pioneers of both Protestant and Masonic thought. The Papacy is nothing like crusaders sacking monasteries, nothing like Protestants claiming any presbyter is a bishop in anything but terminology. Nothing like man setting his own reason above the eight writers of New Testament or the Fathers who exposed them. At least not traditionnally: and if some recent Popes differ, that means they do not belong to Papacy, not that Papacy was Protestantism all along.
The article on St Gregory Palamas, as I said, was saying he was as close to filioque and as far from “proceeds from the Father alone” as the Photian tradition would allow him.
If you have read all of Palamas, why not check out the quotes given by that article and comment with fuller quotes?
Perry,
Yes, as a churchman Cyril deserves no more charity than he offered others. As a theologian, however, we owe him an enormous debt. That doesn’t make him likable.
As for me, I am just a curmudgeon with no right to anyone’s charity. :-)
Lucian,
It is unnecessary to ascribe bad motives to Bekkos. I take most historical participants to be people acting in good faith. They are people with faults but Bekkos isn’t from what I can tell a grossly immoral person and neither is Saint Photios. Besides, it doesn’t help clarify the issues or advance the argument to note as much even if true.
Do You know what drives me mad even more than bad people do? Loud-mouthed, irrespectful stupid people (a la Bekkos). “Not even if one will read through them a thousand times”, he says… uh, boy! :-/
Congratulations, Lucian. Your comments are now moderated.
An interesting article. I hope that it stimulates further scholarly discussion.
I particularly like the question in the penultimate paragraph;
When theologians deny a mediation of divine being, when
they confidently assert an ontology that makes the Son’s mediation
of the Spirit’s “ousia” impossible, one must ask how they have
acquired this mystical knowledge of the Father that shunts the Son
off to the side.
This is a very interesting question.
Many thanks to Professor Gilbert for his thought provoking article.
Evagrius,
to turn your question back at you: why in God’s Name do YOU think that the poor Holy Spirit needs someone mediation to be in contact with the Father? Why do You push Him on the side and out of the way?
Lucian just said:
Why in God’s name do YOU think, that that is what we think?
Because otherwise you would have to deny the filioque (which I don’t see You doing anytime soon), and then murmur something to the extent that if both of them are from the Father, where’s the difference, and why are they not brothers, and so on.
We do NOT think the Father insufficient to be alone origin of the Holy Ghost, we only think he was in fact not without the Son.
We do NOT hold that the Holy Ghost has no direct contact with the Father, but we do quote Greek Fathers who said he proceeds from the Father through the Son, as if they were in those quotes saying the half of the truth in which the Holy Ghost proceeds also from, or through, the Son.
It seems to me that it does vastly less violence to the text if one reads St. John of Damascus through a ‘Photian’ lense than as a Thomist. In the the passage from Aquinas above, it’s a little bit coy to say that when he says ‘We say that he proceeds from the Father, but we do not say that he proceeds from the Son’ he really means that ‘it’s acceptable to say that he proceeds from the Son, we just don’t.’ Further, when you read Book I Chapter 8 of the De Fide, the Damascene seems to go out of his way to make begetting and procession absolutely parallel (in that they are both from the Father) and to deny any possibility of humans being able to say how they’re different. So, there is nothing here that contradicts St. Photius, and it requires quite a lot of reading into the text (a project of course begun by the scholastics) to be able to make the filioque compatible with his thinking. That’s all to say- it doesn’t seem to me that Photius is all that strange for 8th-9th century Greek theology. To be a bit more daring— it seems to me that Photius is just trying to articulate the axiums at work in the Damascene’s (or any Neo-Chalcedonian’s) Trinitarian logic.
To my mind, the problematic areas of Dr. Gilbert’s article are two. One is its dependence on a stark distinction between ‘Old Nicene’ and ‘Neo-Nicene’ theologies. This idea is quite controversial, as he himself recognizes, but it’s beyond my expertise to judge that. It’s my impression that Gilbert is working on fleshing that out some, so it will be interesting to see how that’s received.
The other problem area is his argument that things can be predicated of the Trinity that are neither natural nor hypostatic. At least starting from St. Maximos, that’s just crazy and untenable. (I’m not as well read on the Cappadocians, so I’ll leave others to comment on that). At least, if it’s possible for an attribute to be neither hypostatic nor natural, then the whole edifice of ‘Chalcedonian logic’ collapses and we’re in some serious trouble, both in Trinitarian theology and in Christology. I think Photius was aware of this, and of the five principles that Gilbert and Bekkos claim were invented, this is the one that is most easily demonstrated to have clearly not been invented. Just the amount of ink spilled by Chalcedonian Christological thinkers to show which attributes in Christ are natural and which are personal shows that the assumption that attributes must be one or the other– forgetting that your method and terms have to line up in Christology and Triadology is the mother of quite a lot of heresies………
It seemed a bit coy to St Thomas Aquinas too, which is why his firsthand reaction is refuting it as a Nestorian error. He did not say St Damascene contradicted Photius. But the quote he gave was not as polemically antifilioquist as Photius.
Now that is interesting.
Pneumatomachs that were not Arian argued: if the Holy Spirit also is a divine Person, is he grandson of the father or brother of the Son, or even uncle of the Son?
An Orthodox deacon told me: the Holy Spirit is NOT the Father’s grandson. But it is also, I think, well to hold fast that the Holy Spirit is not the Son’s brother.
It is also interesting, because Western theologians were already saying (St Hilary for example, but also St Athanasius) that the Spirit is the person who proceeds from both the other persons. And therefore neither the Father’s grandson (as Easterners like to parody Western theology, like Lucian the one on this blog just did) nor the Son’s brother.
Now that is like saying: Photius was not a scholastic innovator, since we can argue he was a very subtle scholastic.
Mind you: he was a very subtle scholastic.
So was St Thomas Aquinas too, but I think the Aquinate was more of a hesychast than Photius.
Hans-Georg,
I think we can both agree that Greek theologians’ insistence that procession and begetting are distinctly different forms of generation (though the distinction is ineffable) is their way of ensuring that the Son and the Spirit are not ‘brothers.’
Aquinas’ claim that the Damascene was under ‘local Nestorian’ influence is demonstrably false because we actually have quite a lot of available sources for 8th century Nestorian Trinitarian thought, even if it has only really been examined by scholars interested in the early history of Islam. I’ve read through most of it at different times (the two most important writers for this would be John of Dalyatha, a heterodox Nestorian with very strange Trinitarian formulations, and the catholicos Timothy I, whose letters and famous dispute with the caliph al-Mahdi give us a very good picture of canonical Nestorian Trinitarian thinking at the time) and a concern with denying something like the filioque never comes up simply because no one in the Near East had heard of the idea that the Son is a cause of the Spirit until the controversy on the Mount of Olives in 809. I wish Perry would provide some documentation for his hypothesis that Aquinas is thinking of something related to St. Cyril, as that was pretty tantalizing. But at any rate, I think it’s clear that Aquinas was genuinely not expecting the Damascene to be in direct contradiction to the Latin theology he had received, and so he grasped a bit at straws to try and explain that particular statement away. It would be nice to have a detailed study of how Latin scholastics read the Damascene… anyone know if there is one out there?
As far as whether or not Photius was a ‘subtle scholastic’, that particular label is unimportant for me. My concern in what I had to say was that I think that Photius was trying to simply state the principles that he saw at work in Greek theology of at least the three or four centuries before him— this type of project could, I suppose, be called ‘scholastic’ or in modern terms ‘dogmatic theology’, and it’s a perfectly valid form of theological discourse, probably the only kind of theological discourse any of us here are able to engage with. I think Gilbert follows Bekkos into a ditch when he tries to evaluate Photius solely with reference to the Cappadocians—if one compares him to Maximos, the Damascene, or probably most especially Leontius, then it would be very hard to say that his principles were invented whole cloth. It seems to me very probable that these principles are alien to Latin theology because the Latins did not have to be as deeply concerned with Christology, not having to defend Chalcedon as the Greeks did. If we look at the big picture of Greek theology from the fifth to the eighth centuries, we’re looking at a long project of articulating a very specific logic of Christology and an important part of this logic is that Christological and Trinitarian terms and method must be the same. So, Photius’ statement that an attribute must be either natural or hypostatic is a principle used by every Orthodox theologian after Chalcedon, at least. Without that principle, the theologies of Maximos, Leontius, and the Damascene all fall apart and we’re stuck in a serious mess.
So, my point is that Gilbert’s analysis of Photius is faulty because he evaluates Photius relative the understanding of the Cappadocians that he that has constructed through his reading of Bekkos rather than comparing him to the general edifice of Greek theology as it existed in the generations immediately previous to him. This is all to say that the Greek Trinitarian Theology of Photius’ time and the Latin Trinitarian theology of Bekkos’ time are incompatible. That shouldn’t surprise anyone, and we don’t need to blame Photius for that.
St Thomas did not claim the error spread from Nestorians in the 8th C. If it had come that recently from Nestorians, how could St John of Damascus have missed that it was Nestorian? So, he has not made any claim the falsity of which you have as yet demonstrated.
The same could be claimed – and I do claim it – for Saint Thomas Aquinas. If either of them deviated from that program into syllogising beyond the Fathers, I do not think it was Aquinas.
Thank you, I do.
But will you equally agree that the Western theologians (including St Athanasius, at least when in exile in Trier, or otherwise stating whatever reservations you have against the Quicumque vult) even in the era of arguing against Macedonians solved it by saying the Son is born of the Father, but the Holy Ghost proceeds from both?
Lucian,
I suppose then, that the Scriptural passages regarding the sending of the Holy Spirit did not involve the Son.
On another point. I find it interesting that Bekkos recognized the linguistic, and therefore, conceptual differences between Latin and Greek.
Professor Gilbert’s reference to Gregory Nazianzen’s irenic attitude to differing articulations should make people pause. Those differences were in Greek. How he would have judged the difference between Greek and Latin is something to consider.
Perhaps a third language, ( English since it’s the lingua franca nowadays?), is necessary to resolve the impasse.
The idea is that in order for us to have the Filioque we must have an underlieing infrastructure first, that would allow for its existence… but not only do we NOT have that, but what we DO have is contrary or in opposition to such an infrastructure. (And yes, it didn’t start with Photius, unfortunately, but was there, being articulated in the same very precise terms at least since the struggles of the 4th century, and never went away anywhere, obviously).
So it’s nothing personal against the Filioque or the West, but rather something very general and all-encompassing (and very, very ancient), in which the new-commer (filioque) simply doesn’t fit. — I’m talking only about the East here.
It’s not my fault no-one ever spoke of personal attributes belonging to two persons; or of a third set of attributes, (neither personal, nor natural); or that personal attributes were always described as belonging to one person only. — Sorry. :-| Nor is my fault that the Easten Fathers are all so constant in this line of thought, which they’ve articulated in such precise and uncompromising terms from very early on, and which completely contradicts that of the Western Fathers. — OK?
(St Vincent of Lerins)
Was he likely to mean “all Eastern” even if that were true, when he was himself of the West?
Perry Robinson said: “Second, Maximus even earlier than John expressly and even more precisely denies the Filioque in the letter to Marius”
Me: This ridiculous claim had already been debunked in a thread that you participated in more than a year ago, but you insist on pretending that its a settled fact.
http://bekkos.wordpress.com/2008/01/21/st-maximus-on-the-filioque/
snippet:
” St. Maximus’s teaching here is not unambiguous, and both Orthodox and Catholics have claimed him as supporting their position; but at least this much seems clear: Maximus thinks that part of the reason why the Latin teaching sounds odd to Greek ears is that the Latin phrase has been translated into Greek in a misleading way; by using the Greek term ἐκπορεύεσθαι to translate the Latin procedere, the translators of Pope Martin’s document have given the impression to their Greek-speaking readers that the Latins regard the Son as an originating cause of the Spirit in the same sense that the Father is. In Maximus’s own restatement of the Latin teaching, the word προϊέναι (“coming-forth”) is used instead. ”
For those interested, read the rest of the post, as well as the comments section.
http://bekkos.wordpress.com/2008/01/21/st-maximus-on-the-filioque/
St. Maximus’s teaching here is not unambiguous, and both Orthodox and Catholics have claimed him as supporting their position
If the Latins claim that, why did they reject it during the Reunion Council of Ferrara-Florenza, when the Orthodox put it forth?
If the Latins claim that, why did they reject it during the reunion Councile of the Ferrara-Florence, when the Orthodox put it forth?
I believe that was answered in the first response by Dr Gilbert on that thread:
“I don’t have the book at hand, but I distinctly remember reading in Gill’s The Council of Florence that this letter of St. Maximus to Marinus formed a central part of Bessarion’s argument for union; Bessarion claimed that, if St. Maximus sees the Latins as orthodox, then we should see the Latins as orthodox; if St. Maximus sees the Latins as not viewing the Son as a distinct cause, then we should not see them as doing this, either. This letter seems to have played a fairly large role in Bessarion’s reasoning; to say that “the Latins denied” this letter seems false; they undoubtedly denied the interpretation Mark of Ephesus was putting on it, which was that the Son has no role whatsoever to play in the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit; the Latins could not affirm that without denying all of Latin patristic tradition and most of Greek patristic tradition as well.
http://bekkos.wordpress.com/2008/01/21/st-maximus-on-the-filioque/#comment-90
The thread discussion is getting a little confusing what with the replies, counter replies etc;.
Ted,
The point under discussion was whether anyone prior to Photios wrote in a way to ascribe sole causation to the Father or whether Photios is alone in this. John does and Maximus does. Anastasias of Antioch in the Sixth century does too. (PG 89, 1315) The language is there regardless of how one interprets it.
No I do not persist in anything except denying that the arguments put forward in that thread were good ones. You believe it is settled but I don’t.
Second, Gilbert gave a citation on his own blog from Fr. Jean Miguel Garrigues about how the confusion occurred in the west and how a non-Augustinian gloss of procession was not only possible but existed earlier. I cited sailient parts here. http://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/?s=nub
In some sense, Maximus holds the idea that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as heretical. That is beyond dispute. Maximus deliberately denies then that ἐκπορεύεσθαι can be used since that is what caused the misunderstanding. Rather he uses προϊέναι as shinning forth. To give the gloss that Maximus is denying that the Son is an originating cause doesn’t really help for a number of reasons. First, if he isn’t an originating cause then the Spirit doesn’t have his hypostatic origin from the Son, which seems to contradict the Filioque. Second, it becomes increasingly hard to see how originating and non-originating cause could be “one principle.” Third, it goes beyond what Maximus says and at best it is speculative, which is a rather anemic basis to defend a dogma. If all of the Son’s causality is referred back to the Father, then in what sense is the Son a cause at all? It seems like none if it isn’t hypostatically his causal power. This is one reason why I think Bessarian’s gloss doesn’t really work. Lastly, the language of “shinning forth” certainly sounds like the kind of eternal energetic procession offered by Gregory of Cyrpus. So the question is what does Maximus think “shinning forth” means as opposed to the other term? If the Son can have that power, why not the Spirit too, especially in light of the fact that everything the Spirit has hypothetically from the Son is in turn “referred back to the Father?” It is true that Maximus defends a western teaching of a dual procession as orthodox, but the questions is what was the western teaching at that time. As Fr. Garrigous seems to indicate, there were two views that got mixed together.
Finally, if Maximus thinks that the Spirit can’t be said to proceeds ἐκπορεύεσθαι. So procedere can’t mean ἐκπορεύεσθαι. But Catholic theologians seem to continue to use these terms interchangeably and so seem to fall into the error that Maximus says is heterodox.
The language is there regardless of how one interprets it.
That’s definitely true, and I can personally attest to the veracity of this particular statement; the Greek here is unmistakably clear on the issue, I’m afraid:
Θε χαθολιχσ αρε ωρονγ ανδ ωέρε ριγχτ’ ενδ οφ στορυ.
I think it is time to bring this discussion back to its original point, which is not the procession per se, but whether Bekkos was a more subtle theologian than he has apparently been credited by his Orthodox critics.
What struck me most about Gilbert’s article is the way in which he has Bekkos successfully articulate the Catholic position regarding the procession, and correctly identify the problem caused by the fact that Eastern and Western theological jargon not only differed but also operated at different levels of specificity. To a Catholic this is quite refreshing, as it seems almost impossible to discuss the filioque with contemporary Orthodox strictly in terms of the Catholic understanding of what the interpolation is intended to convey as Catholic teaching.
Orthodox disputants habitually give lip service to the distinction Catholics make between origination and calling forth, but can’t seem to hold fast the distinction before them when rounding on the hated interpolation. Here is an example from Perry:
“To give the gloss that Maximus is denying that the Son is an originating cause doesn’t really help for a number of reasons. First, if he isn’t an originating cause then the Spirit doesn’t have his hypostatic origin from the Son, which seems to contradict the Filioque.”
The “seeming” Perry claims to perceive is essentially irrelevant, as Catholics readily admit that the Spirit does not derive His hypostatic origin from the Son. The filioque simply does not bear the terminological precision Orthodox wish to impose on it.
“Second, it becomes increasingly hard to see how originating and non-originating cause could be “one principle.””
It is a single principle (or spiration) because there is only one procession, not two. Catholics see the Spirit as originating in the Father, but see the Son’s active cooperation (my term, I am not a theologian) as essential to the procession. The Spirit proceeds FROM the Father (in the strict sense) THROUGH the Son. This does beg the question of why ‘through’ was not used in the interpolation instead of ‘and’, but that’s another issue I don’t propose to get into here.
My purpose in this comment is not to rehash the filioque, but to express my admiration for Bekkos’ subtle flexibility of thought, i.e. his ability to detach himself from prior assumptions and look at the patristic evidence with new eyes.
Bekkos is no Photius, of course. What made Photius a great theologian, in my view, is not the fact that he was right or wrong about the filioque, but his ability to systematize consistent operative theological principles from the often chaotic mass of Patristic writings, and this at a time only shortly after Patristic studies had reached its intellectual nadir. Insofar as I can tell, he was the first to do this so successfully and to this degree. In many ways Photius, from a Catholic perspective, can be compared to that great Western systematizer, the Angelic Doctor. Bekkos is clearly not in their league, but he did find the two key weaknesses in the traditional application of Photius’ “system” to the filioque dispute:
1. Bekkos demonstrates that Photios constructed his axioms based a post facto reading of some of the Fathers. This is not to say that Photius’ reading was necessarily wrong. Instead, Bekkos demonstrates that the citations Photius draws on to build his axioms sometimes address narrower points than Photius would have them do, and sometimes could be (and indeed were by Latins) construed differently by readers who came to these texts with different preconceptions.
2. Bekkos also correctly identifies the trap involved in confusing a teaching with the rather summary terminology with which one side alludes to it, and points to Photius’ repeated failure to make this distinction, i.e. to allow for the fact that the Latins might not have meant the teaching he actually condemns.
I would invite all of us here to return to the original article and reread it carefully. One can disagree with the filioque and still admire the ingenious way in which Bekkos undermines what appeared to be Photius’ certainties. Bekkos’ point was not that the filioque was correct, but that one could not conclusively demonstrate that the Fathers would have necessarily rejected the actual Latin teaching behind it (at least as the Latins articulated it in the 13th century). As a result, Bekkos felt that the heretical nature of the teaching could not be conclusively demonstrated either logically or from the Fathers, and that is was thus unsafe to consider it to be in and of itself an insurmountable obstacle to reunion.
Obviously, Catholics will see the force of Bekkos’ arguments more easily than Orthodoxy for whom the effort will involve revisiting the standard patristic citations using something other than their conventional interpretive gloss. Nonetheless, I think the exercise would help demonstrate why Catholics have proven so resistant to Photius’ epistemology, while still recognizing him as a great and brilliantly innovative (in the positive sense) theologian.
Hans,
If the Spirit proceeds from both, then the attribute of proceeding is shared in common by both Father and Son; in which case it’s neither personal, nor natural, and a third class is unknown to the Eastern Fathers.
I think it was logic chopping like that which drove St Thomas Aquinas to logic chopping in mere defense.
I thought once St Thomas Aquinas was too eager using logic rather than Church Fathers to prove points about Holy Trinity, but in that class he is an amateur compared to some readers of Mystagogy by Photius.
Seriously: that kind of reasoning would make “being Father of the Son” another attribute of the Father than being “spirator of the Holy Spirit”, so why is he then always called Father and not Spirator?
Seriously: that kind of reasoning would make “being Father of the Son” another attribute of the Father than being “spirator of the Holy Spirit”
I’m surprised You’re surprised and that You didn’t know this. (Yes, being the Father of the Only-Begotten Son is not the same thing for God as being the Proceeder of His Holy Spirit).
so why is he then always called Father and not Spirator?
He is called Spirator, but rarely.
Lucian,
“If the Spirit proceeds from both, then the attribute of proceeding is shared in common by both Father and Son; in which case it’s neither personal, nor natural, and a third class is unknown to the Eastern Fathers.”
That might follow, but only if you insisted on treating the roles of the Father and the Son in the procession as identical, whereas they are not even similar in kind.
If you can’t acknowledge that Catholics make a real conceptual distinction IN KIND between the procession from the Father and the Son’s role in this procession, we are just going to go around in circles because you are not engaging actual Catholic teaching.
One would have thought that after 11 centuries, Orthodox polemicists would have finally internalized this point. The fact that some still cannot seem to do so raises the question of whether this failure stems from an unwillingness to listen or because doing so would not serve their polemic purposes, as so much of Photius’ critique rests precisely on not making the distinction. Bekkos acknowledges the distinction fully, and concludes as a result that Photius’ critique thus lacks decisive force.
What I will concede to Perry, however, is the possibility that in the 7th century some Westerners may actually have unreflectively seen the two roles as similar in kind, but without actually teaching this explicitly. I am merely speculating here as the origins of the filioque are obscure, and it is not a subject on which a lot of contemporary reflection from the period survives.
If this is the case, then Photius would have played a crucial role in forcing the West to reflect critically on how to exclude unorthodox interpretations of what had become a commonplace credal expression. Without putting them on a level, Photius role for the West would thus have been analogous to that played by Luther whose critique of the medieval Church provided the necessary ground for Trent.
I’m not so sure that all Catholics (throughout space and time) would agree with You on this. I’m glad You don’t see the two processions as one and the same thing, but a simple “primary vs. secondary source” won’t do the trick. So You have to be clear and say wherein the distinction or difference lies, and then make every other Catholic believe the same as You do.
Where did you get the idea that any Catholics believe(d) in TWO processions???? :-o
There is only ONE procession in which the Father and Son have different roles.
From the CCC:
263. The mission of the Holy Spirit, sent by the Father in the name of the Son and by the Son from the Father, reveals that, with them. the Spirit is one and the same God…
264. (quoting Augustine) The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as the first principle and, by the eternal gift of this to the Son, from the communion of both the Father and the Son.
There is nothing in the two paragraphs You offered that teaches that Father and Son have different roles. It only says that the Father gives the power of procession as a gift to the Son — it says “this”, … it doesn’t say “something similar” or “something else”. (Hence, this attribute belongs to just two persons. And, as such, how are we going to classify in the two-categories-scheme of the Eastern Fathers?).
Michael,
I think the sticking point here is how to gloss the Council of Lyons’ “not as from two principles, but as from one principle; not by two spirations, but by one single spiration.”
When Orthodox read this today, at least, the tendency is to read “as from one principle” and “one single spiration” to mean that the Holy Spirit proceeds equally, simultaneously (to use perhaps an inapt temporal metaphor), and in the same way both from the Father and from the Son. That is, the image that it evokes is that of the Father and the Son both breathing forth the Spirit together, rather than the Spirit proceding from the Father and then resting on the Son. This reading is also encouraged by the rather terse syntactic parallelism of “a patre filioque”. So, in order to get at a reading of this that is acceptable to the Orthodox, a fair amount of explanation has to be made, and this explanation sits poorly with the original paralellism of the phrase.
Bekkos’ understanding, on the other hand, of “by one single spiration” apparently would have that spiration being a single one proceding from the Father through the Son, which may be acceptable in an Orthodox undertstanding. However, the words of Lyons are such that that understanding is by no means compulsory and the type of filioquism that Photius attacked is at least equally supportable from the text (and to my mind is the reading that requires less extra-textual explanation). One supposes that the abiguity in the text was deliberate, so as to placate both unionist Greeks like Bekkos and extreme filioquists. This may be my ignorance, but which binding Catholic documents preclude the type of reading of the filioque that Photius attacked?
Maybe the problem is diagrammatic;
Father
/ / \\
Son Spirit
or
Father Son
\\ //
Spirit
or ( imagine three circles), not emanations.
Spirit
Son
Father
Son
Spirit
I know this is trie but I do think some visual abstraction might be helpful.
I’m aware of the Thomistic/Augustinian three concentric spheres model.
I’m glad use guys don’t understand the procession ex Filio to be the same as the one from the Father — but there are one billion Catholics out there. And there’s NO magisterial pronouncement on the issue. So…
So… IF, by absurd, there’s ANY truth to the Filioque whatsoever, it CANNOT be -as far as we’re concerned- something that doesn’t distinguish between the procession from the Father and the one from the Son: and primary vs. secondary won’t do. Nor will uncaused cause / caused cause / caused. Or the three sphere model.
.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.
… But I’m getting ahead of myself: … for now, ALL that I wanted to show wass that the very SAME, very clear, very precise analytical approach was there in the fourth century (in the East) as it was also in Photius’ time: two categories of attributes, not three, namely hypostatical and natural, the former belonging to just one person, never to two. — That’s all for now. Do keep in touch.
.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.
(Well, … this, and the fact that Bekkos was a liar: seriously, if what the guy’s telling is the truth, … WHY does he feel the need to prop it up with lies?)
Lucian,
Actually, I wasn’t thinking of three concentric spheres.
I was thinking of a combination of conical spheres.
Could you please elucidate your point?
Also, calling Bekkos a liar isn’t helpful.
It’s reminiscent of a child losing an argument and stomping off calling the opponent a liar.
Samn!
“I think the sticking point here is how to gloss the Council of Lyons’ “not as from two principles, but as from one principle; not by two spirations, but by one single spiration.””
Lyons helped clarify the Catholic teaching, but obviously it din’t resolve the issue to the East’s satisfaction. Ironically, the “single spiration” bit was intended in part to ease Eastern concerns.
“When Orthodox read this today, at least, the tendency is to read “as from one principle” and “one single spiration” to mean that the Holy Spirit proceeds equally, simultaneously (to use perhaps an inapt temporal metaphor), and in the same way both from the Father and from the Son. That is, the image that it evokes is that of the Father and the Son both breathing forth the Spirit together, rather than the Spirit proceding from the Father and then resting on the Son.”
I wouldn’t say the latter is quite the Catholic view. At least I can’t recall any Western Father using “resting on the Son.” If I can offer you an admittedly rather gross antropomorphic analogy, you could imagine the Spirit originating in the Father and being drawn out of the Father by the Son. This image has a whole lot of problems, and I certainly wouldn’t want to see it as being used as a basis for catechetics, but is closer to how Latin Catholics see the procession.
This points to further complication, Latin Catholics would argue that there would be no procession without the Son, and they see the Son’s role as hypostatic. This has never been dogmatically defined, so far as I can tell, but I don’t know of any Latin Catholics who see it otherwise, though this may be a by-product of centuries of the use of the filioque. It isn’t dogma: very few Orthodox theologians see the Son’s role (such as they understand it) as hypostatic, and the Catholic Church acknowledges that a non-hypostatic understanding is not inherently heretical.
“This reading is also encouraged by the rather terse syntactic parallelism of “a patre filioque”. So, in order to get at a reading of this that is acceptable to the Orthodox, a fair amount of explanation has to be made, and this explanation sits poorly with the original paralellism of the phrase.”
Granted, but the East should perhaps have paid more attention to ALL the nuances of St Leo’s response regarding the interpolation. He discouraged its liturgical use, but defended the theology behind the interpolation largely on the same terms I have outlined, and is on record as commending its use in catechetics.
“Bekkos’ understanding, on the other hand, of “by one single spiration” apparently would have that spiration being a single one proceding from the Father through the Son, which may be acceptable in an Orthodox undertstanding.”
As a phrase perhaps, but the real difficulty lies in the meaning the phrase is intended to convey. Blarchernae appears to explicitly deny a hypostatic role for the Son in the procession, and so doesn’t conform to the Western understanding. If Orthodoxy were to dogmatically declare that viewing the Son’s role as hypostatic is heresy (which, pointedly, it has never done), then we would have a big problem. That would pretty well put the nail in the coffin of any hopes for reunion
“However, the words of Lyons are such that that understanding is by no means compulsory and the type of filioquism that Photius attacked is at least equally supportable from the text (and to my mind is the reading that requires less extra-textual explanation).”
Possibly in Eastern eyes, but I have never met or even heard of a Catholic who believes that the Spirit originates in the Son. Indeed, on would think that the possibility would be precluded by the use of the analogic and strictly sequential titles of Father/Son/Spirit. It isn’t a central doctrine, however, and the only time the issue was discussed at any length iin Catholic circles was when Orthodox raised it.
“One supposes that the abiguity in the text was deliberate, so as to placate both unionist Greeks like Bekkos and extreme filioquists. This may be my ignorance, but which binding Catholic documents preclude the type of reading of the filioque that Photius attacked?”
I think the ambiguity in the interpolation was deliberate, but with respect to the formulations coming out of Lyons, it would probably be the result of an attempt to find common wording for something on which both theological traditions know almost nothing beyond possibly speculative patristic glosses on a few scriptural passages.
As for the subject of Photius’ attacks, there wasn’t anything even remotely approaching doctrinally binding 9th century documentation for him to single out. There was just the practice in much of the West of reciting the creed with the interpolation. If Photius had raised the issue more eirenically as a matter of concern instead of as a club with which to beat back Rome’s challenge to his de facto usurpation of the patriarchal see, the debate might have evolved differently. But we are where we are.
There’s no such thing as a conical sphere. What point?
When I was a child I thought very low of grown-up discussions over ‘sectarian bibles’, as if a bible can be translated otherwise than what it says. Language is language, and religion is religion. And people are honest, even if mistaken: happens to all of us, right? Happened to me numerous times! — But, as it turns out, “they” were right, and I was wrong (see previous sentence). Sectarian bibles were distorted and manipulated in the crassest of manners, and yes, even the unthinkable was true: there were lieing and dishonest people; such people *actually* existed! Christ’s words are stupidly simple: by their fruits you’ll know them, and he was perfectly right. People think that things are more “complicated”… but they’re not.
Bekkos, my dear friend, lied. He actually lied. Yes, I’m not making this up: it’s true, it’s easily verifiable, and it’s only a link away. What did he say? He gave a list of Photius’ principles, saying -with subject and predicate- that they were untrue. One problem though: they are true. And one doesn’t have to read the Fathers “a thousand times” (as he put it) to know this: it’s obvious even from the most random, cursory reading.
So… when someone says that there are no black people in Africa, and that you won’t find any blacks there, not even if you travel the whole continent “a thousand times”… well, we all know Lewis’ trilemma, and I’m not going to propose something similar here for Bekkos. OK?
Lucian,
I am glad for your comments about Bekkos may I dare add from the Synaxarion (the lives of the saints) the following:
Commemorated on October 10, 26 Monkmartyrs of the Zographou Monastery on Mount Athos
In the year 1274 at the Council of Lyons (in France), the Byzantine emperor Michael VIII Paleologos ( note: the Patriarch was John Vekkos), decided to buttress his waning power by forming a union with Catholic Rome. This step evoked universal discontent. In 1278, the emperor issued a decree to introduce the Union at Constantinople by forceful measures, if necessary. Mt. Athos stood in firm opposition to the Union. The Athonite monks sent a letter to Michael pointing out that the primacy of the Pope, his commemoration in the churches, celebrating the Eucharist with unleavened bread, the insertion of the “filioque” [“and from the Son”] into the Creed, could not be accepted by Orthodox, and they asked the emperor to change his mind. “We clearly see,” the letter said, “that you are becoming a heretic, but we implore you to forsake all this and abide in the teachings that were handed down to you…. Reject the unholy and novel teachings of a false knowledge, speculations, and additions to the Faith.
” The Crusaders pushed out of Palestine and finding refuge in the Byzantine Empire, declared to the emperor their readiness to affirm the power of the Pope by fire and sword, if necessary. In addition, Michael had hired mercenaries, both Turks and Tatars, to enforce his decree. The emperor despised the monks of Mt. Athos for their opposition. By Michael’s order, the servants of the Pope descended upon the Bulgarian Zographou monastery. When the demand to accept the Union was presented before the Zographou monks, they refused to listen. They adhered to the doctrines of the Fathers, and fearlessly censured those who accepted the Latin teachings. The majority of the Zographou monks left the monastery, but the most steadfast, twenty-six in number, remained within the monastery tower.
These were:Igumen Thomas, and the monks Barsanuphius, Cyril, Michael, Simon, Hilarion, James, Job, Cyprian, Sava, Jacob, Martinian, Cosmas, Sergius, Menas, Joasaph, Joannicius, Paul, Anthony, Euthymius, Dometian, Parthenius, and four laymen. The holy martyrs for their Orthodox Faith, were burned in the monastery tower on October 10, 1284. (also September 22)
I think we should not be too harsh on Dr. Gilbert’s effort here, which is clearly a prospectus, meant not to rehabilitate Bekkos but to set the stage for it, and to show how it would proceed. I hope this article, by bringing his work on Bekkos to a larger professional audience, will further Dr. Gilbert’s goal of publishing his book.
That said, from a canonical standpoint, I wonder about the fact that Bekkos was condemned, while those whose theology he criticized (St. Photius, and implicitly St. Gregory Palamas and St. Mark of Ephesus) are considered “Pillars of Orthodoxy.” Dr. Gilbert briefly hints at these issues on pages 3 and 13 of his paper, but skates around them.
St. Photius, St Gregory of Palama and St Mark of Ephesus ARE pillars of orthodoxy, and indeed pillars of Christianity. Why to dismiss their “reading of the Fathers” concerning the filioque? Why to accept the roman catholic propositions? Why to attempt to by-pass this, to compromise ourselves, to rise above the Fathers and our Saints??? (these are rhetorical questions by the way)
I strongly advise everyone here to read “I CONFESS ONE BAPTISM…’’. By Protopresbyter George D. Metallinos, D. Th., Ph. D. Dean of the University of Athens, School of Theology
Metallinos was a disciple of the heavily anti-Frankish and anti-Catholic Romanides – correct me if I am wrong – and Romanides was a student of the heavily anti-Catholic since heavily New England Puritan University of Harvard, correct me if I am wrong again.
Photius and Mark of Ephesus have done good in so far as they have shown a way not to bow down to Popes when they are wrong, but I think the occasions they used it on, they were the ones who were wrong.
St Gregory Palamas, as far as I have read in the friendly article given him by Jesuits in Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique was not primarily anti-filioquist at all, and in opposing Barlaam, as far as I have gathered from John Meyendorff, he opposed an early example of liberal theology, as St Thomas Aquinas had opposed earlier, and as was later condemned by Syllabus errorum and Vatican I.
Michael,
Thanks, your comments here have been quite helpful for me.
It’s important to look at the practical results of the ambiguity in both Churches’ definitive statements on the filioque. On the Catholic side, the conciliar definitions allow for a pretty wide range of Trinitarian models, and the usual project when working on the basis of them is to propose models that both fit these definitions and seem like they they might be acceptable to the Orthodox, who get nervous because those same definitions allow very unacceptable models and so in some ways encourage the Orthodox tendency to give uncharitable readings. (Though a curmudgeon could make the argument that uncharitable readings are a valid hermeneutic method to safeguard precision in negotiated texts). On the Orthodox side, there’s really not that much that’s definitively decided beyond ‘NOT BEKKOS,’ or ‘not Lyons, not Florence’ which isn’t much of starting off point for anything positive.
Which leaves us with having to continually re-enact the type of negotiations that happened at Lyons and Florence– a contest of presenting competing readings of the Fathers. Since we’re not going to resolve that issue on this thread, the question at hand is: Is this article, and by extension Dr. Gilbert’s project to revive Bekkos, a productive avenue? On the one hand, giving Bekkos a sympathetic reading is useful as historical methodolgy and it certainly shows us how one stream of Byzantine thought read the Fathers. On the other hand, it’s clearly quixotic, given that very few Orthodox are going to be willing to ignore Bekkos’ condamnation.
But aside from those meta-issues with the project, my difficulty with Gilbert’s article is its treatment of Photius. Arguing that Photius invented his theological principles whole-cloth, as Bekkos and Gilbert do, isn’t productive and won’t win many Orthodox friends. At least, I think any productive avenue is going to have to give Photius as sympathetic a reading as Gilbert gives Bekkos, even if Photius wasn’t the most sympathetic personality himself. Trying to compare Photius solely with (a reading of Bekkos’ reading of) the Cappadocians, while ignoring how the intervening half-millinium read them, is bound to produce strange results. Ultimately, a sympathetic reading of Photius will result in realizing exactly how important Christology was in the East in shaping Trinitarian thought and I think this is a point that the Catholic side needs to take more to heart, in discussing both the filioque and the essence/energies distinction……
@Perry,
I was responding initially to your claim that some how “Maximus even earlier than John expressly and even more precisely denies the Filioque.“
Your second claim in your response that : “Maximus holds the idea that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as heretical Is demonstrably false
As a matter of fact the whole context of his letter shows that he knows that the statement is not heretical, but confusing to the East because of linguistic differences.
1.“With regard to the first matter, they (the Romans) have produced the unanimous documentary evidence of the Latin fathers, and also of Cyril of Alexandria…”
For your second claim to be true you would have to show us evidence that somehow of the “unanimous evidence” that Maximus talks did not contain the formulation “…from the Father and the Son.” But his syntax suggests that’s precisely what he is talking about and his view of it is not heretical.
His point of course being that the Latin formulation is orthodox, because this a recurrence of this formulation, in the Latin fathers and Cyril. How you came to this conclusion that somehow he saw this formulation as heretical, i suppose you will soon tell us. Given that its this formulation he is talking about and defending.
2. On the basis of these texts, they have shown that they have not made the Son the cause of the Spirit — they know in fact that the Father is the only cause of the Son and the Spirit, the one by begetting and the other by procession; but [they use this expression] in order to manifest the Spirit’s coming-forth (προϊέναι) through him and, in this way, to make clear the unity and identity of the essence
This second sentence is of course his way of defending said formulation. Viewing it as way for the west to “make clear the identity of essense,. As Dr Gilbert has pointed out before, the word Cause here is used in the sense of arche or Originating cause.
Samn!
“Which leaves us with having to continually re-enact the type of negotiations that happened at Lyons and Florence– a contest of presenting competing readings of the Fathers.”
Actually, I have come to the conclusion that a common conciliar restatement is not possible (at least at this time). On the upside, however, it might not be necessary.
If the two sides can come to the point of merely disagreeing with respect to the hypostatic nature of the Son’s role, without at the same time ascribing heresy to the opposing view, then the filioque as such need not be a bar to communion. All that would be required would be for the Catholic Church on its own to put forward a dogmatic statement that makes explicit that the Spirit originates in the Father alone, and that of the Son’s role in the procession differs in kind from that of the Father.
“Since we’re not going to resolve that issue on this thread, the question at hand is: Is this article, and by extension Dr. Gilbert’s project to revive Bekkos, a productive avenue? On the one hand, giving Bekkos a sympathetic reading is useful as historical methodolgy and it certainly shows us how one stream of Byzantine thought read the Fathers. On the other hand, it’s clearly quixotic, given that very few Orthodox are going to be willing to ignore Bekkos’ condamnation.”
I don’t see any problem with revisiting his writings. Catholic scholars are willing to accept that Western figures like Abelard might have been judged unfairly, or even that formal Eastern heretics like Nestorius may have actually been misunderstood. Are we to throw out everything Tertullian wrote because he died a Montanist? What about the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia; are we not to revisit these because of his conciliar condemnation? And was Bekkos even condemned for heresy? Was he even condemned for the narrow points the article calls our attention to? I don’t know, as I am not familiar enough with his case.
“But aside from those meta-issues with the project, my difficulty with Gilbert’s article is its treatment of Photius. Arguing that Photius invented his theological principles whole-cloth, as Bekkos and Gilbert do, isn’t productive and won’t win many Orthodox friends.”
I don’t see the article as doing this. Gilbert, who so far as I know remains an Orthodox scholar, isn’t claiming that Photius invented his principles from whole cloth. He is merely agreeing with Bekkos that SOME of the proof Photius adduces from SOME of the Fathers for SOME of his principles MAY rest on anachronistic (though not necessarily fictitious) readings of these sources. If anything, Gilbert helped clarify for me why Catholic scholars consider Photius a great (if uniquely unpleasant) theologian.
“At least, I think any productive avenue is going to have to give Photius as sympathetic a reading as Gilbert gives Bekkos, even if Photius wasn’t the most sympathetic personality himself. Trying to compare Photius solely with (a reading of Bekkos’ reading of) the Cappadocians, while ignoring how the intervening half-millinium read them, is bound to produce strange results. Ultimately, a sympathetic reading of Photius will result in realizing exactly how important Christology was in the East in shaping Trinitarian thought and I think this is a point that the Catholic side needs to take more to heart, in discussing both the filioque and the essence/energies distinction……”
I supect Gilbert’s programme is more modest. Catholic analysis of Photius’ theology is not, in any case, entirely hostile. Catholics mainly take issue with his ecclesiastical politics.
“There’s no such thing as a conical sphere. What point?”
http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=7353760C781238D3
From Walter Russell, a rather eccentric American scientist.
Hans,
I think it goes without saying that most Catholic sources are hostile to Palamas’ teaching. The source you cited seems so in so far as it claims he was wrong in a number of areas. Lots of fathers prior to Palamas deny that the divine essence is capable of being known in any sense whatsoever-Maximus, the Cappadocians, etc.
Peter denying Christ after Tabor isn’t really an objection since the seeing of deity on Tabor doesn’t imply that the agent seeing it is thereby made impeccable. Seeing deity isn’t a sufficient condition for impeccability. Secondly, we affirm that Peter saw the deity in the divine glory, but I am not sure you do.
As for bitterness, you have only to look at Martin Jugie, a theologian of no small stature in Catholicism who referred to Palamas’ teaching as the worst heresy ever to afflict the church and who gives Palamas the most uncharitable of reading.
Given that Palamas denies the filioque explicitly and affirms an eternal energetic procession, I can’t see how it can be said that he is closer to Rome’s teaching. I don’t think Photius would deny an energetic procession as he was trying to secure a hypostatic procession from the Father alone.
“I think it goes without saying that most Catholic sources are hostile to Palamas’ teaching.”
No. It does not. Unless by hostility you mean lack of complete agreement.
“The source you cited seems so in so far as it claims he was wrong in a number of areas.”
Rome claimed it was wrong to deny that we shall see the divine essence if we go to Heaven. The Jesuits are bound by the decisions of Rome.
“Peter denying Christ after Tabor isn’t really an objection since the seeing of deity on Tabor doesn’t imply that the agent seeing it is thereby made impeccable. Seeing deity isn’t a sufficient condition for impeccability. Secondly, we affirm that Peter saw the deity in the divine glory, but I am not sure you do.”
Rome considers seeing Deity in full divine glory the Beatific vision, and a full impediment to preferring creatures or sinning. Rome also considers this happens when and if we get to Heaven.
“As for bitterness, you have only to look at Martin Jugie, a theologian of no small stature in Catholicism who referred to Palamas’ teaching as the worst heresy ever to afflict the church and who gives Palamas the most uncharitable of reading.”
In that case those Jesuits were not called Martin Jugie.
“Given that Palamas denies the filioque explicitly and affirms an eternal energetic procession, I can’t see how it can be said that he is closer to Rome’s teaching. I don’t think Photius would deny an energetic procession as he was trying to secure a hypostatic procession from the Father alone.”
That is still not giving in full the quotes by which the Jesuit writers of that article (there is only one article on Gregory Palamas as a person in that dictionary) support the position that Palamas was obedient to Photian tradition, but not far from filioque.
Michael,
If Bekkos thinks that ἐκπορεύεσθαι and προϊέναι mean the same thing, then he has succeeded in articulating the Catholic position, but failed to see the problem as Maximus articulated since Maximus doesn’t seem to think the two are semantically equivalent, which was the basis of the accusation against the Latins then. Fr. Garrigous seems to me to put his finger on the problem in writing,
“St. Augustine was not embarrassed to speak along with it of a “procession of the Word,” since this term, as opposed to the Greek ekporeusis, does not signify specifically the hypostatic origin of the Spirit in the incommunicable paternal principle, but the order of consubstantial communication within the Trinity beginning from its source of communion in the Father… In seeing in procession the derivation of consubstantiality according to the trinitarian order, the communication of divinity as well to the Son as to the Spirit, St. Augustine comes up against the difficulty of understanding the term processio, in the sense of the ekporeusis of Jn 15:26, as expressing specifically the mode of origin of the Spirit in the Father in relation to the mystery of the generation of the Son. This obscurity, which constitutes the very depths of the trinitarian mystery, becomes, owing to the Latin displacement of the sense of processio, an impenetrable difficulty. The weakness of Latin pneumatology will always, at bottom, remain its incapacity to hold, explicitly, as far as it is possible to do this in the comprehension and language of faith, to the unfathomable antinomy between generation and ekporeusis… Our own task is clearly to note the space in which it is silent and in the interior of which it attempts to take up the confession of the mystery of the Trinity. To do that, it is necessary to show also its inherent limits, beyond which it acknowledges its powerlessness, even in the very mouth of its most eminent interpreter, St. Augustine. This point has long been taken into consideration by the most classic Catholic theologians — for example, Fr. Dondaine, O.P., one of the great specialists on St. Thomas Aquinas’s Treatise on the Trinity. “We should recognize,” he says, “the distance between the two words, the Latin procedere and the Greek ekporeuomai. If, in the end, this latter word was restricted to the personal relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father, in faithfulness to the formulation of St. John, the Latin procedere, already in St. Augustine, covers indistinctly proienai and ekporeuesthai. Processio can signify indifferently, as a general term, the origin both of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; thus we speak in the plural of the ‘Processions ad intra.’ It is also possible to designate by the special term ekporeusis the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father; the Latin expression procedit ab utroque remains outside this precision since it regards the Father and the Son in their community as spirating principle, instead of which the Greek term regards the Father qua source, arche, pege tes theotetos.” [“La théologie latine de la procession du Saint-Esprit” in Russie et Chrétienté, 3-4 (1954), p. 213.]… As the Father appears here before all else as the source of divinity, his monarchy is primarily understood as the principle of trinitarian consubstantiality. The Latin tradition, which St. Augustine recapitulates, considers the hypostatic origination of the Persons in terms of the derivation of Godhead in them, according to the trinitarian order of their consubstantial communion. Not having had to confront the metaphysical subordinationism of a Eunomius, not having had as a point of reference the Neoplatonic metaphysics of participation, the Latin tradition did not feel it necessary to distinguish antinomically between essence and hypostases in God…. In this perspective, in which the origin of the hypostases and the order of their consubstantial communion within the divine essence are viewed synoptically, monarchy, in the sense of the hypostatic, incommunicable principle of the Person of the Father, can only be signified indirectly. St. Augustine, like Tertullian before him, can signify it only in an adverbial way: the Holy Spirit proceeds principaliter from the Father… It fell to the Cappadocian fathers to confess this antinomic mystery of the Father, faced with the metaphysical heresy of Eunomius, and thus to give the Church the deepest expression of trinitarian theology. But the discovery of the paradoxical mystery of the paternal source of the Trinity seems not to have prevented the Cappadocians from considering it also as being, by virtue of its very causality, the principle of trinitarian order. This is true above all for St. Gregory of Nyssa who, since he was younger than St. Basil and St. Gregory of Nazianzus, had experienced the Apollinarian crisis and balanced the antinomies directed against Eunomius with a clarification of the order of trinitarian consubstantiality which manifests itself in the economy: “The difference between being cause and being caused is the only thing that distinguishes the divine persons from one another, while faith teaches us that there is a Principle and there is that which is from the Principle. And besides, in that which is from the Principle we recognize another distinction, namely, between being immediately from the Principle and being by him who is immediately from the Principle. In this manner, the name of the Only Son remains without ambiguity the Son’s and nevertheless, without question, the Spirit has his ekporeusis from the Father, the mediation of the Son preserving for him his property of being Only Son and not depriving the Spirit from his natural relation with the Father.”’ (PG 45, 133)… Here one sees the extreme development of the Latin tradition concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit and the deepest point of its penetration in trinitarian theology. While the Cappadocian fathers would make manifest the monarchy, as origin, in the Father, of the irreducible hypostatic diversity of the Son and of the Spirit, the Latin fathers placed in light the manner in which the persons are, for one another, conditions in the consubstantial communion in the unique Godhead. The divine essence is, in fact, communicated from the Father, according to the order of consubstantial processions of the Son and of the Spirit. Between generation and ekporeusis there is no order, because the hypostatic diversity of the Son and the Spirit, coming forth from the Father, is an immeasurable abyss. But, in the eternal manifestation of the consubstantial communion of the Trinity, there appears an order of processions which allows one to speak, with the entire Tradition, of the First, the Second, and the Third Person.
If Rome denies that the person of the Spirit is generated from the Father and the Son then I am not sure what we are arguing about. It seems to me that that denial is the only way you can consistently claim that I have failed to hold fast to the distinction between procession and shining forth. If the Son has the causal power of the Father so as to make it possible to generate the Spirit, then the distinction on hand seems to me to be not a denial of origination but that this is had in a derivative way. This is the only way it seems to me that procession and “shinning forth” could be said to be equivalent.
I used the term ‘seeming” as a standard way philosophers qualify claims in a charitable and weaker way.
As I have said before above, it is my understanding that the Catholic position aticulated by Florrence is that the person of the Spirit is generated from the Father and the Son as from one principle, so I am not sure how you can say that Catholics deny that the Spirit has his hypostatic origin from the Son. If the filioque is imprecise, then I can’t see how this doesn’t fall back into the position of Photios that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone.
I don’t deny Florentine position is that there is only one procession, but given the distinction between the causal power, derivative and uniderived, the unity of the procession will necessarily entail some form of plurality and composition. If it is one principle, then the unity of it is something else than the respective hypostatic causal acts but over and above it.
As for “through” the Catholic position as I understand it equates from and through as was done at Florence so to say that the Spirit is through the Son is the same as saying he is from the Son hypsotatically, so I am not sure how you can imply that these two are somehow different. If they were, then the Spirit is not from the Son hypsotatically while only being from the Father hypostatically, which is to deny the Filioque as articulated by Florence. The reason why “through” was not used is because as noted above, the Latin was impresice and western theologians, and those unionists like Bekkos took them to be equivalent.
Perry
“I think it goes without saying that most Catholic sources are hostile to Palamas’ teaching. The source you cited seems so in so far as it claims he was wrong in a number of areas.”
There isn’t a single significant theologian, Catholic or Orthodox, whom I do not believe “was wrong in a number of areas.” Am I then hostile to all of them, or merely to theology in general?
“As for bitterness, you have only to look at Martin Jugie, a theologian of no small stature in Catholicism who referred to Palamas’ teaching as the worst heresy ever to afflict the church and who gives Palamas the most uncharitable of reading.”
Let me correct you on this point. Whatever Jugie’s characterization of Palamas’ writings, he WAS a theologian of “small stature in Catholicism,” otherwise you would have to argue that Catholicism virtually pullulated with medium to great-statured theologians. The man doesn’t even have his own Wikipedia entry. I strongly suspect he is better known to Orthodox theologians than he was to his Catholic colleagues.
It may surprise you to learn this, but most Catholic students of theology do not as a general rule lie awake at night trying to navigate their way through the Palamite controversy. :-)
Michael,
I think the salient point of discussion is why think that the shinning forth or resting on the Son must be hypostatic as opposed to energetic? If I can have an eternal procession without a hypostatic one, why is the latter necessary?
You also wrote that Blarchernae condemns the idea of a hypostatic generation from the Son but then say that the East has never dogmatically condemned the idea. Why think that the former doesn’t amount to the latter?
Ted,
I still maintain the claim I made. Maximus doesn’t say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son but “shines forth.” He also seems to think that the basis of the accusation was using ἐκπορεύεσθαι of the Son. By indicating that ἐκπορεύεσθαι can’t be used of the Son the accusation is removed. Per Florence ἐκπορεύεσθαι is used of the Son and held to be equivalent with προϊέναι and so falls under the original accusation and is not excused by Maximus’ defense. This is why Florence claimed that “from” and “through” meant the same thing.
If you think my claims are demonstrably false, please produce the demonstration. The whol econtext shows that he understands taking προϊέναι as equivalent with ἐκπορεύεσθαι is heretical, which is why he affirms the first and leaves out the second with respect to the Son.
It wasn’t confusing to the East. What was confused was the Latin which was imprecise which was then translated back into Greek as ἐκπορεύεσθαι for both meanings.
As for your point I do not need to show that the evidence didn’t contain the phrase. I’d only need to show that the phrase was restricted to προϊέναι and didn’t include ἐκπορεύεσθαι. I think the above citation does a good amount of that particularly in the case of Hilary. I think other scholarly literature demonstrates it in the case of Cyril. The phrase is of itself not problematic, buts possible meaning is.
Maximus sees some formulation as heretical since he says “On the basis of these texts, they have shown that they have not made the Son the cause of the Spirit…” So if we say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, then Maximus thinks this is heretical. Then he distinguishes procession from shinning forth, “…but [they use this expression] in order to manifest the Spirit’s coming-forth (προϊέναι) through him and, in this way, to make clear the unity and identity of the essence….” Now, procession then for the Latins at that time can’t be used of the Father and the Son, but only “shinning forth.” That isn’t Florence which takes the two to be the same. But Maximus says that they aren’t. Maximus implicitly agrees that if one were to take the two t be the same, then the accusation would stick. Hence the accusation sticks to Florence.
As to point two, If the Son has the Father’s causal power, then the Son is an originating cause. If the Son does not have the Father’s causal power, then there is, sans Filioquist arguments, something that the Father did not give to the Son of the “everything the Father has is mine.”
Furthermore, what is the “shinning forth”? Since it is not an energetic procession from or through the Son, is it essential or hypostatic? If there is no distinction between essence and energy as the Orthodox maintain, where exactly does the “shinning forth” fall?
Michael,
When I wrote hostile as tantamount to thinking X is wrong in a number of areas, I meant seriously wrong warranting some measure of condemnation, rebuke, etc and in terms of overall thought, not in terms of isolated polints. Palamas gets about a far a shake from Catholic sources as Photios did.
If I am not mistaken, didn’t Martin Jugie essentially write the dogmatic statement on the Assumption of Mary? Does Rome put theologians of small stature in a place to do such things? Second, if he was as you say, why do Catholic sources routinely rely on him as a reliable source for Palamas, even in the place of the primary sources, to this day?
I don’t take Wikepedia to be a measure of much.
Biographical information on Catholic students of theology reflects their concerns, but not the importance of any given theological issue.
“…if he was as you say, why do Catholic sources routinely rely on him as a reliable source for Palamas, even in the place of the primary sources, to this day?”
Because Palamas is not a major subject of Catholic reflection. Few Latin rite Catholics have written on him, and few can read Palamas in the ogriginal Greek, so Jugie comes out as moderately significant fish in a really tiny (Catholic) scholarly pond of Palamologists.
Perry,
The that the Son’s role is hypostatic is not Catholic dogma, it is just virtually universally believed among Catholics. You are not viewed as a heretic for believing otherwise.
Conversely, the Catholic Church is not prepared to subscribe dogmatically to the essence/energy distinction to which you allude, and for which you can construe but very little support in the Western Fathers.
“If I can have an eternal procession without a hypostatic one, why is the latter necessary?”
One isn’t. But Blachernae, as I understand it (and please note, I am not an expert) appears to have three problems for Catholics: it continues to misrepresent Catholic belief regarding the filioque, it is unclear on whether the eternal “manifestation” of the Spirit is eternal in a timeless sense as opposed to a merely unending sense, and it presupposes acceptance of an essence-energy distinction with which most Catholics are not universally comfortable (think “Immaculate Conception” for Orthodox).
That said, from some bits I have gleaned from the odd passage quoting Meyendorff, Blachernae need not be Orthodoxy’s last word on the subject, and its teachings could perhaps be recast in light of these three objections in such a way as to make it more acceptable for Catholics.
“You also wrote that Blarchernae condemns the idea of a hypostatic generation from the Son but then say that the East has never dogmatically condemned the idea. Why think that the former doesn’t amount to the latter?”
I don’t think you are quoting me correctly. We have been around this tree a few times already. Catholics do not see the Son as “generating” the Spirit hypostatically or otherwise. My point was that the East, at Blachernae and elsewhere, has condemned quite a few ideas it ascribed to the filioque, but has always shot blanks as Catholics cannot recognize themselves in any of the anathemas.
If you really want to torpedo any hopes at reunion, just convince a Pan-Orthodox council to anathemize the idea that the Son plays any active role in the procession. Good luck with that, as you would then end up anathemizing quite a few Eastern Fathers as well.
Michael,
It seems to me from reading Florence, that it says that the Son’s role is hypostatic. If it isn’t, what is it, essential? What other possible role is there?
If Rome doesn’t permit or subscribe to the e/e distinction, what does ‘shinning forth” mean? As for support among the western fathers, that depends I suppose on what we mean by that term, doesn’t it? Is a Ireneaus western father?
By the eternal manifestation at Blachernae, I take it to be an energetic procession and what Maximus denotes by “shinning forth.” I am not clear why you would give a distinction between a timeless and an everlasting one since neither of us think of God as temporally circumscribed.
As for Blachernae, I am only concerned with how you view its dogmatic status. You seem to think that it doesn’t amount to a theological and dogmatic condemnation of the Latin view. Is this because you think it was lacking in terms of the actual process or because it missed the theological target? As to whether Catholics recognize themselves in the condemnation, I am not sure that is a necessary condition as Nestorius or others did not recognize themselves in the respective condemnations.
As I have made plain, I do not deny the Son’s role in an eternal energetic procession of the Spirit.
Perry,
“It seems to me from reading Florence, that it says that the Son’s role is hypostatic. If it isn’t, what is it, essential? What other possible role is there?”
That’s a good question but, as far as Catholics are concerned, one for Orthodox to resolve amongst themselves. Catholics DO see it as hypostatic, there can be no doubt or equivocation on this point. They also have difficulty seeing how it could NOT be hypostatic. However, they leave it open to Orthodox to understand the filioque in non hypostatic terms, if that makes more sense to them, so long as a hypostatic interpretation is not thereby dogmatically ruled out.
“If Rome doesn’t permit or subscribe to the e/e distinction, what does ‘shinning forth” mean?”
It’s more that the West does not want to be bound by it anymore than the East wants to be bound by scholastic distinctions. You just don’t dogmatize theological methodology.
“Is a Ireneaus western father?”
Of course. He is also a Greek Father. Catholics do not equate “Greek” with “Eastern”.
“I am not clear why you would give a distinction between a timeless and an everlasting one since neither of us think of God as temporally circumscribed.”
Well, I could be misunderstanding Lucian, but he led me to believe that some Orthodox will only admit to a temporal role for the Son in bringing the Spirit to us after Pentecost. I will let him speak for himself.
“As for Blachernae, I am only concerned with how you view its dogmatic status. You seem to think that it doesn’t amount to a theological and dogmatic condemnation of the Latin view.”
Yes, this is my understanding. I would, however, have to read a reliable translation before definitively pronouncing on this, but nothing I have read so far leads me to believe that it engaged actual Catholic teaching in any decisive manner.
“Is this because you think it was lacking in terms of the actual process or because it missed the theological target?”
I am not quite sure what you mean by “process.” I accept it as an authentic and authoritative Orthodox attempt to articulate in positive terms what the bishops present thought about the procession in light of what they understood as the Catholic position. My suspicion, however, is that they were handicapped in doing so by the fact that they were not totally of one mind (and so had to resort to a degree of creative ambiguity), and that accurate testimony by the Eastern bishops most perspicacious with regards to the Catholic position was inhibited by intimidation.
“As to whether Catholics recognize themselves in the condemnation, I am not sure that is a necessary condition as Nestorius or others did not recognize themselves in the respective condemnations.”
Whether Nestorius considered himself a “Nestorian” as the Council understood it, is an open question. From the Catholic perspective, Orthodoxy had repeatedly condemned the filioque as a formula. Formulae are not doctrine. They are part of praxis (albeit rooted in doctrine). So Orthodox condemnations of the filioque as a formula are just like all the other tiresome Orthodox critiques of ancient Western liturgical practices that just don’t happen to be Byzantine. Such condemnation would only actually strike home if explicitly glossed with an interpretation Catholics actually held.
Let me give you an example. Let’s say Orthodoxy were to condemn Catholicism for its heretical denial of the resurrection as demonstrated by its use of unleavened bread in the Eucharist. Catholics would just roll their eyes. Ditto the filioque.
“As I have made plain, I do not deny the Son’s role in an eternal energetic procession of the Spirit.”
Ergo, Catholics do not see you as a heretic. But you cannot therefore expect (Latin rite) Catholics to subscribe to this formula, as it rests on a distinction that is alien to their theological tradition. This is what I meant by Blachernae potentially holding some promise, but not being a basis for reunion.
I have to admit as a layman with no theological education, I am utterly lost. Is this what our leaders discuss when they get together?
AMM,
It depends what you mean by “leaders.” The Pope and the Orthodox Patriarchs mainly discuss pastoral issues when they meet. Theological minutae, such as on the filioque, are discussed by official representatives at a fairly high level mainly at the formal national and international dialogues. These are usually co-chaired by a Cardinal and a Metropolitan, but with theologians from both sides as participants.
Specifically on the filioque, you can see one example of a joint report here: http://www.usccb.org/seia/filioque.shtml
Lucian,
I wrote:
“From the CCC:
263. The mission of the Holy Spirit, sent by the Father in the name of the Son and by the Son from the Father, reveals that, with them, the Spirit is one and the same God…
264. (quoting Augustine) The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as the first principle and, by the eternal gift of this to the Son, from the communion of both the Father and the Son.”
You wrote:
“There is nothing in the two paragraphs You offered that teaches that Father and Son have different roles. It only says that the Father gives the power of procession as a gift to the Son — it says “this”, … it doesn’t say “something similar” or “something else”.
For 263:
1. The Spirit is “sent by the Father in the name of the Son;”
2. The Spirit is “sent by the Son from the Father;”
3. The Spirit is not sent by the Son in the name of the Father;
4. The Spirit is not sent by the Father from the Son;
5. Ergo, the roles of the Father and the Son differ.
For 264:
1. The Spirit proceeds “from the Father as the first principle;”
2. The Spirit does not proceed from the Son as the first principle;
3. Ergo, the roles of Father and the Son differ.
Seriously, I tire of this discussion. I found Gilbert’s article interesting and enlightening, but find our failure to engage substantively on it disheartening. It seems we can’t get past our prejudices. I have nothing more to say on the filioque, and will not post any further on this thread until and unless it returns to discussing the article (preferably dispassionately).
If Perry or Samn! need further clarification from me on anything I wrote here regarding the filioque, they can send their questions to our host who can then forward them to me privately if he feels they need answering.
If I have misrepresents the Catholic position in any way, Fr. Paul, who knows vastly more than I do on the subject should feel free to step in and correct what I have written.
In what manner does it proceed from the Son then? Still as from a principle? But a secondary one? If so, what does that mean? (#3 seems odd, since it apparently contradicts John 15:26).
In what manner does it proceed from the Son then? Still as from a principle? But a secondary one? If so, what does that mean? (#3 seems odd, since it apparently contradicts John 15:26).
http://bekkos.wordpress.com/2008/06/24/on-anastasius-the-librarian/#comment-294
‘As I have pointed out in a previous blog exchange, St. Maximus elsewhere writes, “For just as the Holy Spirit exists, by nature, according to substance, as belonging to the Father, so also does he, according to substance, belong to the Son, in that, in an ineffable way, he proceeds substantially from the Father through the begotten Son” (Question 63 to Thalassius, PG 90, 672). St. Maximus says here that the Holy Spirit proceeds substantially from the Father through the begotten Son, and that this substantial proceeding from the Father through the begotten Son occurs in an ineffable way. A sending in time hardly qualifies as an ineffable, substantial proceeding. It seems to me that St. Maximus is saying here, as many other Greek fathers had said before him, that the Holy Spirit receives his very divine substance, from the Father, through the begotten Son. The Spirit’s proceeding through the Son is not an afterthought or an optional extra; it pertains to what he is, not only to what he does in time. And that is the teaching, I would say, that St. Maximus sees as compatible with what Latin fathers like St. Augustine of Hippo say when they say that the Holy Spirit proceeds “from the Father and the Son.”